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Abstract. We solve the dynamics of large spherical Minority Games (MG)
in the presence of non-negligible time dependent external contributions to the
overall market bid. The latter represent the actions of market regulators, or other
major natural or political events that impact on the market. In contrast to non-
spherical MGs, the spherical formulation allows one to derive closed dynamical
order parameter equations in explicit form and work out the market’s response
to such events fully analytically. We focus on a comparison between the response
to stationary versus oscillating market interventions, and reveal profound and
partially unexpected differences in terms of transition lines and the volatility.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Ln, 64.60.Ht
1. Introduction
Minority Games (MG) [1, 2] are simple mathematical models designed to elucidate and
explain the origin of the nontrivial macroscopic fluctuation phenomenology observed
in real markets, on the basis of so-called inductive decision making by large numbers
of interacting agents [3]. Their great strength is that they can be solved analytically
using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems, in particular with
generating functional analysis techniques [4, 5, 6]. We refer to the recent textbooks
[7, 8] for historical backgrounds, the connection between MGs and real markets,
details on mathematical methods, and full references. Now that the standard MGs
have been solved and understood satisfactorily, attention must turn to generalizing
the mathematical technology developed so as to apply to models that are more
realistic economically. In this paper we try to contribute to this aim by studying
analytically the dynamical response of MG markets to non-negligible events in the
outside world that impact on the overall market bid (which in MGs is a proxy for
the asset price). These events could be accidental (e.g. natural disasters, changes in
resource availability), political (e.g. election results, major management incompetence
or corruption scandals), or interventions by market regulators. Such ingredients are
incorporated easily into the fabric of MG-type models, by simply adding to the
overall market bid time-dependent external terms; the tricky stage is to work out
mathematically the consequences of such terms. The simplest case is that where
the external bid term is stationary. Here only minor modifications of the standard
formalism are required; see e.g. [9] (using the replica method) or [10] (using generating
functional analysis). For non-stationary external bid contributions, in contrast, one
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is generally forced to either resort to numerical simulations (see [10]), or turn to
those generating functional analysis versions that involve explicit representations of
the overall bid process, as developed for MGs with real market histories [11, 12]. In
the latter studies only infinitesimal external bid perturbations have been considered
so far, in view of the complexity of the formalism. There is, however, one special
class of MG versions where adding time-dependent external bids does not lead to
serious mathematical complications: the spherical MGs as introduced in [13, 14].
We show in this paper that here it is still possible to derive fully explicit and exact
equations for time dependent order parameters (correlation and response functions);
time-dependent external bids are found to be mathematically harmless, and one can
even allow for (partial) market impact correction as in [15]. We focus on comparing
the long-time solution of these equations for stationary external bids to those found
for oscillating external bids. As expected, these two cases are found to generate very
different macroscopic consequences, in terms of phase diagrams and in terms of the
volatility. Some of these are intuitively clear, such as the profound impact of oscillating
market interventions on the volatility, but some are not at all intuitive, such as the
independence of the phase diagram in the case of oscillating external bids on the
amplitude of the intervention (in contrast to stationary bids). All our theoretical
results are tested against numerical simulations, and find excellent confirmation.
2. Definitions
In MGs one considers N agents, labeled usually by Roman indices i = 1, . . . , N . At
each time step t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} of the game each agent i submits a trading action, a
‘bid’ bi(t), in response to public information µ(t) which in fake history MG versions
is chosen randomly and independently from the set {1, . . . , p} (where p = αN with α
finite). The rescaled total market bid in the game at time t is subsequently defined as
A(t) = Ae(t) +
1√
N
∑
i
bi(t) (1)
Here Ae(t) could represent e.g. random market perturbations, actions by market
regulators, or other external events (natural, social, political, etc.) that can change
the overall asset demand in the market directly. Each agent i has S ‘look-up table’
strategiesRia = (Ria1 , . . . , R
ia
p ) ∈ {−1, 1}p, with a = 1, . . . , S. If agent i decides to use
strategy a at time t in the game, his bid at that stage will be bi(t) = R
ia
µ(t). In the MG
an agent i finds himself winning at time t if his decision bi(t) turns out to be opposite
in sign to the total bid, i.e. if bi(t)A(t) < 0. All agents monitor the performance of
their strategies, in order to decide which one to use. To this end, they assign points
to each of their strategies based on the update rule
pia(t+ 1) = pia(t)− ηRiaµ(t)
[
A(t)− κ√
N
(
R
iai(t)
µ(t) −Riaµ(t)
)]
(2)
where η is a learning rate (which sets the unit time scale), and where the first
minus sign implements reward for minority decisions. The term proportional to
κ ∈ [0, 1] represents a (partial) correction by individual agents of A(t) for their
own contribution, as in [15]. The strategy played by agent i at time t is then
ai(t) = argmaxa∈{1,...,S} pia(t). In this paper we limit ourselves to S = 2; viz. two
strategies per agent. It is now sufficient for agents to keep track only of the differences
qi(t) =
1
2 [pi1(t)−pi2(t)]. Upon also replacing in the right-hand side of (2) the random
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µ(t) at each step t by an average over all possible values (the so-called batch version
of the game), viz. RHS[µ(t)]→ p−1∑µ≤p RHS[µ], and with η = 2α√N‡ one finds
qi(t+ 1) = qi(t) + θi(t)− 2√
N
∑
µ≤p
ξµi
(
Aµ(t)− κ√
N
φi(t)ξ
µ
i
)
(3)
Aµ(t) = Ae(t) + Ωµ +
1√
N
∑
j
φj(t)ξ
µ
j (4)
with ξµi =
1
2 (R
i1
µ −Ri2µ ), ωµi = 12 (Ri1µ +Ri2µ ), Ωµ = N−1/2
∑
i ω
µ
i , and φi(t) = sgn[qi(t)].
We have also added a perturbation field θi(t) to define response functions later. Finally
we introduce a spherical constraint into the model, of the type proposed in [14]: we
replace the previous (so-called batch MG) definition φi(t) = sgn[qi(t)] by
φi(t) = qi(t)/λ(t), λ(t) = [N
−1
∑
i
qi(t)
2]1/2 (5)
The above spherical MG version is a generalization of [14]. It is not unique; the
alternative spherical MG in [13] differs from the present formulation in at what stage
and for which variables the relevant nonlinearities are replaced by pseudo-linear laws.
3. Generating functional analysis
3.1. Derivation of exact order parameter equations
The generating functional analysis (GFA) method is based on the calculation of the
generator Z[ψ] = 〈exp[−i∑it ψi(t)φi(t)]〉, by interchanging the averages 〈. . .〉 over
paths (which here, in the absence of decision noise, reduce to averaging over initial
conditions) and · · · over the disorder (i.e. the strategies). It has become the standard
tool to study MG dynamics, so we may refer to e.g. [8] for technical details. For
N → ∞ and upon choosing θi(t) = θ(t) for all i, the method leads to the following
self-consistent equations for two-time correlation- and response functions Ctt′ and Gtt′ ,
written in terms of averages 〈. . .〉⋆ over an effective single agent process:
t 6= t′ : Ctt′ = 〈φ(t)φ(t′)〉⋆, Gtt′ = ∂〈φ(t)〉⋆/∂θ(t′) (6)
A further order parameter λ(t) is to be solved from Ctt = 1, reflecting the spherical
constraint, and causality ensures that Gtt′ = 0 for all t ≤ t′. The effective single agent
process is defined by the following stochastic equation, with φ(t) = q(t)/λ(t):
q(t+ 1) = q(t) + θ(t) − α
∑
t′≤t
[
(1I+G)
−1− κ1I]
tt′
φ(t′) +
√
αη(t) (7)
Here η(t) is a zero-average Gaussian noise, characterized by 〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = Σ[Ae]tt′ ,
Σ[Ae]tt′ = [(1I +G)
−1D[Ae](1I +G
†)−1]tt′ (8)
D[Ae]tt′ = 1 + Ctt′ + 2Ae(t)Ae(t
′) (9)
The effective Gaussian noise replaces the statistics of the originalN agents by evolution
uncertainty for one effective agent. We can now appreciate the advantages of the
spherical version. The effective equation (7) is linear in φ(t), which allows us to derive
fully explicit dynamical equations for the order parameters. The only nontrivial step
‡ The
√
N ensures that the relevant time scales are O(N0); the factor 2α leads to simple equations.
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in this derivation is to show via integration by parts that 〈η(t)φ(t′)〉⋆ = (Σ[Ae]G†)tt′ .
For θ(t)→ 0 the final result is
λ(t+1)Ct+1,t′ − [λ(t) + ακ]Ctt′ = α[(1I +G)−1D[Ae](1I +G†)−1G†]tt′
− α[(1I +G)−1 C]tt′ (10)
λ(t+ 1)Gt+1,t′ − [λ(t) + ακ]Gtt′ = δtt′ − α
[
(1I +G)−1G
]
tt′
(11)
By solving these equations for the kernels {C,G}, together with the condition Ctt = 1
from which to extract λ(t), we can explore the dynamics of the original MG model for
N →∞, since the physical meaning of {C,G} is
Ctt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈φi(t)φi(t′)〉 (12)
Gtt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂〈φi(t)〉/∂θi(t′) (13)
The advantages of the spherical MG are that one can derive an exact formula for the
volatility (see below), and that the explicit nature of its order parameter equations
allows us to analyze the effects of the bid perturbations Ae(t) much more effectively
that in ordinary MGs.
3.2. Bid average and fluctuations
The statistics of the overall bids Aµ(t) in (4) can once more be extracted from a suitable
generating functional, namely Z[ϕ] = 〈exp[i√2∑µt ϕµ(t)Aµ(t)]〉. It generates the
relevant moments of the overall bids via differentiation, e.g.
〈Aµ(t)〉 = − i√
2
lim
ϕ→0
∂Z[ϕ]
∂ϕµ(t)
(14)
〈Aµ(t)Aν(t′)〉 = − 1
2
lim
ϕ→0
∂2Z[ϕ]
∂ϕµ(t)∂ϕν(t′)
(15)
Following the familiar steps of the generating functional analysis technique leads us
back to the previous saddle-point problem, but now we obtain an additional expression
for the bid moments. We refer to [8, 10] for full details of such calculations, and limit
ourselves here to giving the final result:
〈Aµ(t)〉 =
∑
t′
(1I +G)−1tt′ Ae(t
′) (16)
〈Aµ(t)Aν(t′)〉 = 〈Aµ(t)〉 〈Aν(t′)〉+ 1
2
δµν [(1I +G)
−1D0[Ae](1I +G
†)−1]tt′ (17)
where D0[Ae]tt′ = 1+Ctt′ (note that D0[Ae] still depends on Ae(t) via the kernel C).
Clearly, in the presence of finite external bid perturbations the system is no longer
guaranteed to evolve towards a state with zero-average bid statistics. We can now
define a fluctuation volatility by the following expression:
σ2fl = limτ→∞
1
τp
∑
t≤τ
∑
µ
{
〈[Aµ(t)]2〉 − 〈Aµ(t)〉 2
}
= lim
τ→∞
1
2τ
∑
t≤τ
[(1I +G)−1D0[Ae](1I +G
†)−1]tt (18)
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Note, however, that in the presence of non-stationary Ae(t), even in the absence of
anomalous response and upon assuming self-averaging with respect to the disorder
it will generally no longer be true that σfl is identical to the disorder-averaged
conventional volatility σ as defined by
σ2 = lim
τ→∞
1
τp
∑
t≤τ
∑
µ
[Aµ(t)]2 −
[
lim
τ→∞
1
τp
∑
t≤τ
∑
µ
Aµ(t)
]2
(19)
The difference between σ and σfl reflects bid oscillations which are deterministic and
therefore excluded from σfl. We will derive an exact relation between the two later.
4. Time translation invariance with constant or oscillating external bids
In the remainder of this paper we focus on the choices Ae(t) = A˜ and Ae(t) = A˜(−1)t,
where the asymptotic consequences of bid perturbation are most easily quantified.
Experience with previous MG versions suggests that there will be two types of players
in the stationary state: ‘frozen’ agents, with qi(t) growing linearly with time, and
‘fickle’ agents, where qi(t) does not diverge with time. In view of this we consider two
types of solutions with respect to the spherical constraint parameter λ(t): a regime
where limt→∞ λ(t) = λ (finite), and another regime where λ(t)→∞ as t→∞.
4.1. General formulae
For Ae(t) = A˜(−1)ζt with ζ ∈ {0, 1} our equations (10,11) will have time-translation
invariant (TTI) solutions, since here (9) gives D[Ae]tt′ = 1 + Ctt′ + 2A˜
2(−1)ζ(t−t′).
Upon assuming Ctt′ = C(t − t′) and Gtt′ = G(t − t′), so that the same is true for
D[Ae] and Σ[Ae], our equations (10,11) then reduce for finite values of t to
C(t+1)− ψ0C(t) = αψ1
{
[(1I+G)−1D[Ae](1I+G
†)−1G†](t)− [(1I+G)−1 C](t)
}
(20)
G(t+1)− ψ0G(t) = ψ1
{
δt0 − α
[
(1I+G)−1G
]
(t)
}
(21)
with
ψ0 = lim
t→∞
[λ(t−1)+ακ]/λ(t), ψ1 = lim
t→∞
1/λ(t) (22)
If λ(t) → λ for t → ∞ one has ψ0 = (λ + ακ)/λ and ψ1 = 1/λ, whereas if λ(t) → ∞
one has ψ0 = 1 and ψ1 = 0 (note: since strategy valuations can diverge at most
linearly with time, the same must be true for λ(t) so limt→∞ λ(t − 1)/λ(t) < 1 is
ruled out). There is, however, an important subtlety. It is not clear that in the case of
diverging λ(t) one can use equations (20,21) to calculate observables such as χ or χˆ, as
this requires that the limits τ →∞ in χ =∑t≤τ G(t) and t→∞ in (22) commute. If
they do not commute (as will be the case), this means that the time it takes to evolve
from initialization to a state with (ψ0, ψ1) = (1, 0) diverges, so such states will in
practice not be observed. Equations (20,21) invite us to switch to Fourier transforms,
C(t) =
∫ π
−π
dω
2pi
eiωtCˆ(ω), Cˆ(ω) =
∞∑
t=−∞
e−iωtC(t) (23)
The Fourier transform of the kernel (9), in particluar, is seen to be
Dˆ[Ae](ω) = 2piδ(ω) + Cˆ(ω) + 4piA˜
2δ(ω − ζpi) (24)
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One expects the relevant static observables to include the integrated responses to
static and oscillatory fields, viz. χ =
∑
tG(t) = Gˆ(0) and χˆ =
∑
t(−1)tG(t) = Gˆ(pi).
With these definitions we can write (20,21) as
Cˆ(ω)
[
|1+Gˆ(ω)|2(eiω − ψ0) + αψ1[1 + Gˆ(−ω)− Gˆ(ω)]
]
= 2piαψ1Gˆ(ω)[δ(ω) + 2A˜
2δ(ω − ζpi)] (25)
(eiω − ψ0)Gˆ(ω) = ψ1
[
1− αGˆ(ω)/[1 + Gˆ(ω)]
]
(26)
We must also enforce the spherical constraint C(0) = 1, which gives
∫
dωCˆ(ω) = 2pi.
The right-hand side of (25) dictates that the solution must me of the following form,
where we have built in the spherical constraint, with c0 ∈ [0, 1]:
Cˆ(ω) = 2pi[c0δ(ω) + (1− c0)δ(ω − pi)] (27)
Equations (25,26) then reduce to the following set:
c0[αψ1 + (1+χ)
2(1−ψ0)] = αψ1χ[1 + 2A˜2δζ0] (28)
(1−c0)[αψ1 − (1+χˆ)2(1+ψ0)] = 2αψ1χˆA˜2δζ1 (29)
(1− ψ0)χ(1 + χ) = ψ1(1 + χ− αχ) (30)
− (1 + ψ0)χˆ(1 + χˆ) = ψ1(1 + χˆ− αχˆ) (31)
We can next work out the bid statistics in TTI states. Here formulas (16,18) are
seen to give the following, which shows (as expected) that the effects of stationary or
oscillatory external bid perturbations are generally reflected in the bid averages:
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
〈Aµ(t)〉 = A˜δζ0
1 + χ
, lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
(−1)t〈Aµ(t)〉 = A˜δζ1
1 + χˆ
(32)
σ2fl =
1+c0
2(1 + χ)2
+
1−c0
2(1 + χˆ)2
(33)
4.2. Solution with diverging constraining force: fully frozen states
In states where λ(t) → ∞ for t → ∞ one has (ψ0, ψ1) = (1, 0), so equations (20,21)
reduce to C(t) = 1 and G(t) = 0 for all t, indicating a fully frozen microscopic
state with c0 = 1. The simplest potential solution of our remaining equations is
that where we subsequently assume the time limits in the definition of {χ, χˆ} to
commute with those in (22). It then follows from (28,29,30,31) that χ = χˆ = 0,
and the volatility (33) would become σ2fl = 1. Unfortunately, the relevant limits do
not commute, which follows from a more careful analysis of the effective single agent
process. Although still c0 = 1, the calculation of χ and χˆ has to be done explicitly.
Upon defining Q = limt→∞ q(t)/t, Λ = limt→∞ λ(t)/t, η = limt→∞ t
−1
∑
t′≤t η(t
′),
and θ = limt→∞ t
−1
∑
t′≤t θ(t
′), and upon writing (7) in integrated form, one finds
Q =
θ +
√
αη
1 + (α/Λ)[(1 + χ)−1 − κ] (34)
This gives Q(η), where η is a zero-average Gaussian random variable with 〈η2〉⋆ =
limt→∞ t
−1
∑
ss′≤t〈η(s)η(s′)〉 = (1 + c0 + 2A˜2δζ0)/(1 + χ)2 = 2(1 + A˜2δζ0)/(1 + χ)2.
The susceptibility now follows from χ = Λ−1∂〈Q(η)〉⋆/∂θ = [Λ
√
α]−1〈∂Q(η)/∂η〉⋆,
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and Λ follows from the spherical constraint limt→∞〈φ2(t)〉⋆ = 1, which translates into
〈Q2(η)〉⋆ = Λ2. So we find the following two coupled equations, respectively,
χ =
1
Λ[1 + (α/Λ)[(1 + χ)−1 − κ]] (35)
Λ =
√
2α(1 + A˜2δζ0)
(1 + χ)[1 + (α/Λ)[(1 + χ)−1 − κ]] (36)
To calculate χˆ we require an infinitesimal oscillating field θ(t) = (−1)tθ˜, and use
χˆ = lim
θ˜→0
∂
∂θ˜
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
(−1)t〈 q(t)
λ(t)
〉⋆ = 0 (37)
by virtue of q(t)/λ(t) → Q(η)/Λ as t → ∞. Solving the above equations for χ and λ
and substituting the result into (33) gives
χ =
1√
2α(1 + A˜2δζ0)− 1
(38)
Λ = − 1− α(1 − κ) +√α(3 + 2A˜2δζ0)/
√
2(1+A˜2δζ0) (39)
σ2fl =
(
1− 1/
√
2α(1 + A˜2δζ0)
)2
(40)
Ergodicity breaks down when χ → ∞, i.e. at αc,1(A˜) = 12 (1 + A˜2δζ0)−1. Secondly,
we see that the above solution breaks down when λ(t) no longer diverges with time,
which happens when [1 + α(1 − κ)]2 = 12α(3 + 2A˜2δζ0)2/(1+A˜2δζ0), i.e. at
αc,±(A˜, κ) =
R−2(1−κ)±
√
R2−4(1−κ)R
2(1−κ)2 , R =
(3+2A˜2δζ0)
2
2+2A˜2δζ0
(41)
The solution αc,− is unphysical as it obeys αc,− ≤ αc,1, which implies that it occurs
in the nonergodic regime where the above formulae are no longer valid. The solution
αc,+ is relevant as it obeys αc,+ ≥ αc,1. Thus the regime of diverging λ(t) is bounded
on the left (as a function of α) by a non-ergodicity transition at α = αc,1(A˜) and on
the right by a transition to states with finite λ(t) at α = αc,+(A˜, κ). The transition
value αc,+(A˜, κ) increases monotonically with increasing κ; it is minimal at κ = 0,
taking the value αc,+(A˜, 0) =
1
2 [R−2 +
√
R2−4R], and diverges at κ = 1.
4.3. Solutions with finite constraining force
In the alternative scenario limt→∞ λ(t) = λ ∈ IR we substitute into (28,29,30,31) the
values ψ0 = (λ+ακ)/λ and ψ1 = 1/λ. If we also write λ as λ =
1
2α(γ−κ), to simplify
our equations further, we find
c0 =
χ+ 2χA˜2δζ0
1− κ(1+χ)2 , 1− c0 =
2χˆA˜2δζ1
1− γ(1+χˆ)2 (42)
ακχ2 + χ[1 + α(κ− 1)] + 1 = 0 (43)
αγχˆ2 + χˆ[1 + α(γ − 1)] + 1 = 0 (44)
Solving the last two equations for χ and χˆ gives two possibilities for each:
χ± =
α(1−κ)−1±
√
[α(1−κ)−1]2 − 4ακ
2ακ
(45)
χˆ± =
α(1−γ)−1±
√
[α(1−γ)−1]2 − 4αγ
2αγ
(46)
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It follows from the demand χ ∈ IR that solutions with a finite constraining force exist
only if [α(1−κ)−1]2 − 4ακ ≥ 0, that is, only if
α ≤ α˜c,− = 1
(1+
√
κ)2
or α ≥ α˜c,+ = 1
(1−√κ)2 (47)
Furthermore, upon investigating the limit κ → 0 (no impact correction) in (45) we
find limκ→0 χ− = 1/(α−1) and limκ→0 χ+ =∞, so the physical solution must be χ−:
χ =
α(1−κ)−1−
√
[α(1−κ)−1]2 − 4ακ
2ακ
(48)
which is finite for all κ > 0, and positive for α > 1/(1− κ). To find the static order
parameter c0 we need only combine (48) with the first equation of (42). The remaining
two equations, viz. (46) and the second equation of (48), serve only to determine the
quantities χˆ and γ. Substituting (48) into (42) gives
c0 =
2α(1 + 2A˜2δζ0)[α(1−κ)−1−
√
[α(1−κ)−1]2 − 4ακ]
4α2κ− [α(1+κ)−1−
√
[α(1−κ)−1]2 − 4ακ]2 (49)
We extract from this that c0 = −α−α2(1+2κ)+O(α3) for small α, and that c0 ↓ −∞
for α ↑ α˜c,−. Hence the solution (48,49) is unphysical in the regime α ∈ [0, α˜c,−]. This
leaves the regime α > α˜c,+. Here we are sure that χ > 0 (since 1/(1 − κ) < α˜c,+),
and we find c0 = 1/α(1−κ) + 2κ/α2(1−κ)2 + O(α−3) for α → ∞, and that c0 ↑ ∞
for α ↓ α˜c,+. Hence the solution (48,49) is physical in the regime α ∈ [α˜c,2,∞), where
α˜c,2(Ae, κ) ≥ 1/(1−
√
κ)2 is defined by the condition c0 = 1. This last critical line is
most easily derived indirectly, by first using (42) to write it as a condition on χ, giving
χc,2 =
√
(1 + 2A˜2δζ0)2 + 8κ(1 + A˜2δζ0)− 1− 2A˜2δζ0
2κ
− 1 (50)
This is then inserted into (43) and the result is easily solved for α, giving
α˜c,2(Ae, κ) =
2(Ξ−1−2A˜2δζ0)
(Ξ−1−2A˜2δζ0−2κ)(3+2A˜2δζ0−Ξ)
(51)
Ξ =
√
(1+2A˜2δζ0)2+8κ(1+A˜2δζ0) (52)
After (tedious) reworking of this result, using the definitions of Ξ and R and the
identity Ξ = [2(1+ A˜2δζ0)(R−4(1−κ))]1/2 to connect the various short-hands, one
finds that this critical line (51) marking c0 = 1 with finite λ(t) is identical to the
previous critical line (41). For A˜ = 0 we recover the corresponding formula of [14]:
α˜c,2(0, κ) =
4κ+ 5 + 3
√
1 + 8κ
4(1− κ)2 (53)
Let us finally turn to the susceptibility χˆ, which we need to calculate the volatility
(33), and which is to be solved together with γ from (44) and the second equation in
(42). One finds upon eliminating γ that
χˆ± =
−1
1±
√
α[1 + 2A˜2δζ1/(1−c0)]
(54)
Since the present solution regime always has α > 1, we see that the two distinct
solutions χˆ± represent in-phase and out-of-phase responses of the market to the
oscillating external bid input, and that neither will be able to diverge. The volatility
(33) now follows upon substituting the result (54), together with (48) and (49).
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5. Phase diagrams
We can now summarize the picture obtained by analyzing the time-translation invari-
ant states in terms of a phase diagram, where the control parameters are α, κ, and A˜.
The three phases of the system are the following:
α ∈ (αc,2,∞) : oscillating phase (O), c0 < 1, χ <∞, χˆ 6= 0, λ(t) <∞
α ∈ (αc,1, αc,2) : frozen phase (F), c0 = 1, χ <∞, χˆ = 0, λ(t)→∞
α ∈ [0, αc,1) : anomalous phase (A), c0 = 1, χ =∞
The precise dependence of the transition lines αc,1 and αc,2 on the two remaining
control parameters (A˜, κ) is furthermore controlled strongly by whether the external
bid perturbation is static (ζ = 0) or oscillatory (ζ = 1). In the former case one finds
αc,1(A˜) =
1
2
(1 + A˜2)−1 (55)
αc,2(A˜, κ) =
R(A˜)−2(1−κ) +
√
R2(A˜)−4(1−κ)R(A˜)
2(1−κ)2 , R(a) =
(3+2a2)2
2+2a2
(56)
Here the frozen (F) phase will consistently grow with increasing values of A˜, due to
both its left boundary αc,1(A˜) decreasing with A˜ and its right boundary αc,2(A˜, κ)
increasing with A˜. This is easily understood: a static external bid perturbation
diminishes the impact of the internal bid contributed by the agents, and makes it
easier for the agents to find a suitable strategy that will land them in the minority
group. At κ = 0 (no self-impact correction) the transition point αc,2 simplifies to
αc,2(A˜, 0) = 2(1 + A˜
2) = 1/αc,1(A˜). For oscillatory perturbations Ae(t) = A˜(−1)t, in
contrast, the situation is very different: here the relevant transition lines are strictly
independent of the amplitude A˜, and are obtained by evaluating the above formulae
at αc,1(0) and αc,2(0, κ), viz.
αc,1 =
1
2
, αc,2(κ) =
5 + 4κ+ 3
√
1 + 8κ
4(1− κ)2 (57)
However, although in the case of oscillatory perturbation the phase diagram is
independent of A˜, in the oscillating (O) phase there will be a significant dependence
on A˜ of the volatility. In all cases we find that the effect of self-impact correction is
to strengthen the frozen (F) phase, with the oscillating phase vanishing altogether for
full impact correction (i.e. for κ = 1).
It follows from expressions (32) that throughout the phases F and O the system is
not able to compensate fully for stationary external bid perturbations; since χ is finite,
the average bid will be nonzero for any nonzero perturbation amplitude A˜. Only at the
transition line αc,1(A˜), where nonergodicity sets in and χ diverges, does the bid average
vanish. This is the situation that was also encountered in ordinary MGs [10]. In our
present spherical MG, however, we are able to inspect also the impact of oscillating
external bid perturbations, and find that with such perturbations the situation is
worse: since χˆ remains finite everywhere, we will always retain an oscillating (and
predictable) nonzero overall bid average, even if we enter the nonergodic regime.
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Figure 1. Phase diagrams for static external bid perturbations, Ae(t) = A˜,
exhibiting an oscillating phase (O), a frozen phase (F), and an anomalous phase
(A). The latter is characterized by χ = ∞. Dashed lines: the F→A transition
αc,1. Solid lines: the F→O transition αc,2. Left diagram: transitions in the (α, κ)
plane. Here we show the lines for A˜ = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 (left to right in the case of F→O,
right to left in the case of F→A). Right diagram: transitions in the (α, A˜) plane
for κ = 0 (no self-impact correction), where αc,2(A˜, 0) = 1/αc,1(A˜). For static
external bid perturbation, increasing A˜ always increases the F phase.
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Figure 2. Phase diagrams for oscillating external bid perturbations, Ae(t) =
A˜(−1)t, with the same definitions of phases and transitions as in the previous
figures. For oscillating bid perturbations the phase diagram is independent of the
perturbation amplitude A˜.
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Figure 3. Macroscopic observables for static external bid contributions Ae(t) =
A˜. Top row: frozen correlations c0 for κ = 0 (left), κ = 0.25 (middle) and κ = 0.5
(right); with in each picture the values as measured for A˜ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Bottom row: volatility σ for κ = 0 (left), κ = 0.25 (middle) and κ = 0.5
(right); with in each picture the values as measured for A˜ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. In all
figures the connected markers indicate simulation results (full circles: biased initial
conditions; open circles: unbiased initial conditions), with solid lines showing
the corresponding theoretical predictions. The vertical dashed lines mark the
transition values αc,1(A˜) (left, transition from the nonergodic regime with finite
spherical constraint force regime for small α to the frozen regime) and αc,2(A˜, κ)
(right, transition from the frozen regime with infinite spherical constraint force to
the large α ergodic regime with finite spherical constraint force).
6. Tests against numerical simulations
In this section we test our predictions regarding the values of the long-time order
parameters and the locations of phase transition lines, for stationary and oscillating
external bid contributions, respectively, against numerical simulations. All simulations
were carried out with systems of size N = 3000, for both unbiased (qi(0) = ±10−4)
and biased (qi(0) = ±1) random initializations. Observables were always measured
over a duration of 2000 batch iterations, following an equilibration stage of 1000 batch
iterations. When comparing theoretical predictions to simulation measurements it
became immediately clear that of the two possible saddle-points in (54) the physical
one is χˆ+, the in-phase solution with high volatility; henceforth all theoretical
predictions will correspond to this saddle-point.
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Figure 4. Macroscopic observables for oscillating external bid contributions
Ae(t) = A˜(−1)t. Top row: frozen correlations c0 for κ = 0 (left), κ = 0.25
(middle) and κ = 0.5 (right); with in each picture the values as measured for
A˜ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Bottom row: volatility σ for κ = 0 (left), κ = 0.25
(middle) and κ = 0.5 (right); with in each picture the values as measured for
A˜ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Note the different vertical volatility scales compared to the
previous figure. In all figures the connected markers indicate simulation results
(full circles: biased initial conditions; open circles: unbiased initial conditions),
with thick solid lines showing the corresponding theoretical predictions. The
vertical dashed lines mark the transition values αc,1 =
1
2
(left, transition from
the nonergodic regime with finite spherical constraint force regime for small α
to the frozen regime) and αc,2(κ) (right, transition from the frozen regime with
infinite spherical constraint force to the large α ergodic regime with finite spherical
constraint force).
The volatility σ that is measured in simulations is the conventional one given
in (19), for which we still have to derive an analytical expression. Upon combining
definition (18) of σfl, for which we have derived prediction (33), with (19) (following
any given initial state, so that the brackets 〈. . .〉 are irrelevant, and assuming self-
averaging of both volatilities over the disorder realization for N →∞) we see that
σ2 = σ2fl + limτ,p→∞
{ 1
τp
∑
t≤τ
∑
µ
Aµ(t)
2 − 1
τ2p2
∑
tt′≤τ
∑
µν
Aµ(t)Aν(t′)
}
= σ2fl + limτ→∞
{1
τ
∑
t≤τ
[∑
t′
(1I +G)−1tt′ Ae(t
′)
]2
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Figure 5. Examples of measured values (connected markers) versus predicted
values (thick solid lines) of the spherical constraint force λ, as measured for
A˜ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with κ = 0. The vertical dashed lines mark the transition
values αc,1 (left, transition from the nonergodic regime with finite spherical
constraint force regime for small α to the frozen regime) and αc,2 (right, transition
from the frozen regime with infinite spherical constraint force to the large α
ergodic regime with finite spherical constraint force). The force λ is is indeed
seen to diverge at the predicted values of α.
−
[1
τ
∑
t≤τ
∑
t′
(1I +G)−1tt′ Ae(t
′)
]2}
(58)
In time-translation invariant stationary states with Ae(t) ∈ {A˜, A˜(−1)t} this becomes
σ2 = σ2fl +
∑
ss′
(1I +G)−1(s)(1I +G)−1(s′)
× lim
τ→∞
{ 1
τ
∑
t≤τ
Ae(t−s)Ae(t−s′)− 1
τ2
∑
tt′≤τ
Ae(t−s)Ae(t′−s′)
}
= σ2fl +
{
A˜2/(1 + χˆ)2 if Ae(t) = A˜(−1)t
0 if Ae(t) = A˜
(59)
The results are shown in figures 3, 4, and 5. One observes excellent agreement between
theory and numerical experiments, both in terms of the values of the observables and
the locations of the O→F and F→A transitions. In particular, we find confirmation
of the somewhat surprising prediction that, although in terms of market stability
the oscillating external bid term is a disaster for the market (the market always
responds in-phase to the oscillation, i.e. making the deviations from market efficiency
consistently worse), the locations of the phase transition lines remain always identical
to what they were in the absence of oscillatory external disruption (i.e. for A˜ = 0).
The effects of impact correction are relatively minor, limited to enlarging the frozen
phase F, to dampening the fluctuations, and to reducing the non-ergodicity effects in
the anomalous phase A.
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7. Discussion
In this paper we have studied analytically the response of spherical minority games
(MG) to external time-dependent market disruption of the overall market bid, which
is envisaged to model the effects of either market regulators or other socio-political or
natural events outside the market that impact directly on the asset demand and hence
the asset price. The advantages of the spherical formulation of the game are that one
can derive fully explicit (and exact) macroscopic dynamical equations and work out the
market’s response rigorously and effectively, even if one includes self-impact correction
(where agents correct their actions for their own impact on the market), and that the
volatility can be calculated exactly. We have focused specifically on evaluating and
comparing the long-time consequences of two types of external bid terms: stationary
ones, Ae(t) = A˜, and oscillating ones, Ae(t) = A˜(−1)t. These two cases give rise to
different phase diagrams and different behaviour of the market volatility. The presence
of an oscillating external bid term is disasterous for the efficiency of the market: the
market’s response is always to oscillate in phase with the perturbation, making the
situation worse and increasing significantly the volatility. Yet, rather surprisingly,
the phase diagram in this case is not at all affected by the imposed external bid
oscillation. All this is more or less the opposite of how the market responds to
stationary external bid terms, where the phase diagram is strongly affected by the
amplitude of the bid perturbation, but the fluctuations remain largely unaffected.
All theoretical predictions have been tested against numerical simulations, and found
to be supported perfectly well. Our present study emphasizes the need for further
development of those versions of the generating functional analysis formalism that
include the stochastic overall bid dynamics explicitly, as in [11, 12], so that one can
also tackle the MG market’s response to events in its environment for non-spherical
(i.e. more realistic) versions, where the route to explicit macroscopic equations that
proved fruitful in this paper is no longer available.
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